FINANCE, GROWTH, and POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

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Does financial deepening lead to longrun growth?

The literature

- Lucas (1988)
- King and Livine (1993)
- Beck and Livine (2004, 2000) and others
- Rousseau and Wachtel (2011)

What are my Contributions?

 I use a dynamic panel growth model to estimate how democratic political institutions affect the impact of financial deepening on long-term growth

 And whether the effect of democratic political institutions on the link between financial deepening and long-term growth is heterogeneous across developing countries with different income levels

My findings

 Democracy mitigate the positive effect of financial deepening on long-term growth in developing countries

 There's no differential effect of democracy on the impact of financial deepening on longterm growth across developing countries with different income levels

Data and variables

- 1982-2011, 5th year observation, and 79 developing countries
- 4 sources: financial deepening indicators from the IMF database, political institution measures from polity iv project and freedom house databases, and controls from the World Bank
- Variable:
- GDP per capita growth and lag GDP per capita
- ii. credit to the private sector/GDP, liquid liabilities/GDP, bank deposit/GDP, and private credit by deposit bank and other financial institutions/GDP
- iii. Polity2, democracy, and political rights index
- iv. Debt/GNI, trade, inflation, and net inflows of FDI

Empirical Specification

Dynamic model

•
$$y_{i,t} = \alpha y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 F D_{i,t} + \beta_2 F D_{i,t} * Pol2_{i,t} + \beta_3 Pol2_{i,t} + \gamma' z_{i,t} + \mu_t + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

 $y_{i,t}$ is annual per capita GDP growth at time t in country i. $FD_{i,t}$ is one of four measures of financial deepening. $Pol2_{i,t}$ is polity2 measure of democracy. $Z_{i,t}$ is the vector of standard controls. μ_t is time fixed effects. η_I is country fixed effects and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term.

 β_2 is the coefficient of interest

Sys-GMM

| Dep. variable | GDP per capita growth | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Polity2 | 5.249 (2.466)** | 3.010 (1.817) | 5.759 (2.803)** | 3.268 (4.976) |
| Credit | 0.171 (0.059)*** | | | |
| Credit * polity2 | -0.183 (0.071)** | | | |
| M3 | | 0.054 (0.024)** | | |
| M3 * Polity2 | | -0.059 (0.033)* | | |
| Pcdbfin | | | 0.177 (0.075)** | |
| Pcdbfin * Polity2 | | | -0.190 (0.086)** | |
| Bank deposit | | | | 0.095 (0.131) |
| Bank deposit * Polity2 | | | | -0.094 (0.154) |
| log (1+inflation) | 0.158 (0.327) | -0.419 (0.426) | 0.108 (0.345) | -0.318 (0.420) |
| Trade openness | 0.005 (0.009) | -0.008 (0.007) | 0.006 (0.009) | -0.002 (0.007) |
| Gov. consumption | -0.022 (0.058) | -0.023 (0.054) | -0.041 (0.066) | -0.012 (0.087) |
| FDI | 0.059 (0.169) | 0.240 (0.046)*** | 0.069 (0.135) | 0.121 (0.222) |
| Debt | -0.030 (0.073) | -0.090 (0.048)* | -0.088 (0.082) | -0.067 (0.064) |
| log (GDP per capita _{t-1}) | -0.501 (0.306) | -0.092 (0.291) | -0.545 (0.350) | 0.204 (0.433) |
| Constant | 1.198 (2.415) | 1.869 (2.831) | 1.498 (2.473) | 2.015 (3.013) |
| Hansen p-value | 0.64 | 0.34 | 0.58 | 0.17 |
| AR2 p-value | 0.88 | 0.40 | 0.84 | 0.79 |
| Observations | 313 | 314 | 313 | 314 |
| Number of countries | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 |
| Number of instruments | 28 | 50 | 30 | 22 |
| Country fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |

| Dep. variable | GDP per capita growth | | | |
|--|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Freedom House | 4.746 (1.725)*** | 3.254 (1.637)* | 4.488 (2.161)** | 1.391 (1.930) |
| Credit | 0.131 (0.032)*** | | | |
| Credit * Freedom House | -0.148 (0.040)*** | | | |
| M3 | | 0.049 (0.018)*** | | |
| M3 * Freedom House | | -0.058 (0.028)** | | |
| Pcdbfin | | | 0.122 (0.056)** | |
| Pcdbfin * Freedom House | | | -0.136 (0.064)** | |
| Bankdp | | | | 0.016 (0.047) |
| Bankdp * Freedom | | | | -0.014 (0.061) |
| Log (1+inflation) | 0.099 (0.296) | -0.421 (0.413) | 0.078 (0.298) | -0.553 (0.484) |
| Trade openness | -0.005 (0.009) | -0.009 (0.007) | -0.004 (0.010) | -0.005 (0.010) |
| Debt | -0.055 (0.065) | -0.087 (0.053) | -0.072 (0.074) | -0.077 (0.059) |
| Government consumption | -0.015 (0.060) | -0.031 (0.056) | -0.036 (0.065) | -0.044 (0.059) |
| FDI | 0.182 (0.130) | 0.236 (0.050)*** | 0.171 (0.114) | 0.232 (0.051)*** |
| log (GDP per capita _{t-1}) Constant | -0.370 (0.262) | -0.075 (0.281) | -0.435 (0.291) | -0.129 (0.276) |
| CONSTAIR | 0.881 (2.095) | 2.104 (2.628) | 1.658 (2.186) | 3.964 (2.596) |
| Hansen p-value | 0.79 | 0.37 | 0.63 | 0.26 |
| AR2 p-value | 0.86 | 0.56 | 0.79 | 0.43 |
| Observation | 314 | 315 | 314 | 315 |
| Number of countries | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 |
| Number of instruments | 28 | 50 | 30 | 50 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |

| Dep. variable GDP per capita growth | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Demcr2 | 3.041 (1.361)** | 2.111 (1.358) | 3.422 (1.631)** | 1.580 (3.243) |
| Credit | 0.112 (0.029)*** | | | |
| Credit * Demcr2 | -0.114 (0.034)*** | | | |
| M3 | | 0.041 (0.018)** | | |
| M3 * Demcr2 | | -0.043 (0.024)* | | |
| Pcdbfin | | | 0.115 (0.042)*** | |
| Pcdbfin * Demcr2 | | | -0.122 (0.048)** | |
| Bankdp | | | | 0.047 (0.087) |
| Bankdp * Demcr2 | | | | -0.040 (0.108) |
| Trade openness | -0.002 (0.009) | -0.009 (0.008) | -0.002 (.009) | -0.003 (0.012) |
| Government consumption | -0.017 (0.062) | -0.032 (0.055) | -0.034 (0.065) | -0.034 (0.066) |
| FDI | 0.118 (0.136) | 0.241 (0.050)*** | 0.125 (0.113) | 0.177 (0.115) |
| Debt | -0.069 (0.065) | -0.085 (0.052) | -0.080 (0.075) | -0.058 (0.069) |
| log (1+inflation) | 0.218 (0.313) | -0.364 (0.427) | 0.203 (0.321) | -0.303 (0.443) |
| log (GDP per capita _{t-1}) | -0.398 (0.294) | -0.056 (0.290) | -0.515 (0.333) | -0.183 (0.399) |
| Constant | 2.572 (2.224) | 2.296 (2.658) | 2.512 (2.143) | 3.491 (2.428) |
| Hansen p-value | 0.71 | 0.34 | 0.68 | 0.09 |
| AR2 p-value | 0.70 | 0.39 | 0.60 | 0.57 |
| Observation | 314 | 315 | 314 | 315 |
| Number of countries | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 |
| Number of instruments | 28 | 50 | 30 | 22 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |

| Dep. variable | GDP per capita growth | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Polity2 | 5.598 (2.664)** | 5.166 (2.624)* | 5.518 (2.624)** | 5.739 (3.067)* |
| Credit | 0.178 (0.066)*** | 0.171 (0.061)*** | 0.176 (0.060)*** | 0.181 (0.067)*** |
| Credit * polity2 | -0.188 (0.078)** | -0.183 (0.074)** | -0.196 (0.084)** | -0.204 (0.344) |
| Credit * polity2*LIC | -0.063 (0.048) | | | -0.053 (0.317 |
| Credit *polity2*LMIC | | 0.009 (0.024) | | 0.009 (0.303) |
| Credit * polity2 *UMIC | | | 0.007 (0.021) | 0.012 (0.301) |
| Trade openness | 0.004 (0.009) | 0.004 (0.009) | 0.004 (0.009) | 0.003 (0.010) |
| Government consumption | -0.029 (0.059) | -0.021 (0.059) | -0.023 (0.058) | 0.029 (0.059) |
| FDI | 0.063 (0.165) | 0.066 (0.159) | 0.062 (0.166) | 0.067 (0.159) |
| Debt | -0.037 (0.073) | -0.036 (0.073) | -0.031 (0.073) | -0.038 (0.076) |
| log (1+inflation) | 0.167 (0.333) | 0.171 (0.328) | 0.159 (0.325) | 0.167 (0.348) |
| log (GDP per capita _{t-1}) | -0.680 (0.371)* | -0.485 (0.320) | -0.546 (0.332) | -0.692 (0.545) |
| Constant | 2.461 (2.727) | 1.094 (2.380) | 1.446 (0.485) | 2.551 (3.467) |
| Hansen p-value | 0.66 | 0.64 | 0.65 | 0.66 |
| AR2 p-value | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.89 | 0.88 |
| Observation | 313 | 313 | 313 | 313 |
| Number of countries | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 |
| Number of instruments | 29 | 29 | 29 | 31 |
| Year fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country fixed effects | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Summary and Conclusions

1) Democracy doesn't enhance the impact of financial deepening on long-term growth

2) The impact of democracy on the association of financial deepening and long-term growth is not different across developing countries with different income levels

THANK YOU

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